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Re-evaluating the exclusion of psychopathy from the 
mental disorder defence in Scots law 
 
Simon D Barnes* 
Abstract 
The insanity defence in Scots law was recently reformed and replaced by a statutory 
defence which expressly excludes psychopathy, insofar as this might form the sole basis 
of a plea. The Scottish Parliament closely followed the recommendations of the Scottish 
Law Commission, which justified the exclusion partly by reference to its own definition 
of psychopathy. This definition drew from, but simplified, features from a range of clinical 
psychiatric perspectives. In this paper I examine the Commission's portrayal of 
psychopathy, and argue that it represents an oversimplification of a complex and evolving 
scientific understanding. I also argue that scientific evidence supports the possibility that 
some members of the excluded group lack capacity for criminal responsibility, a 
possibility that is obscured by this oversimplification. In light of this examination, I make 
some recommendations for policy-related discussion in this area: first, greater attention 
ought to be paid to scientific research; second, more complex responsibility-related issues 
are at play than the Commission recognises, and which invite closer scrutiny; and third, 
greater consideration should be given to non-responsibility-related issues pertinent to 
whether psychopathic persons ought to be given access to such a defence.   
 
A.  Introduction 
   
The insanity defence in Scots law was reformed fairly recently, and replaced by the defence in 
s.51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (henceforth “CPSA”). The new law, 
which was inserted by s.168 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 and 
came into force in June 2012, included an explicit exclusion for one class of personality 
disorders (“PD”s): any PD “characterised solely or principally by abnormally aggressive or 
seriously irresponsible conduct” could not form the sole basis of a plea.1 
This exclusionary phrase, stated in the explanatory notes to the CPSA to apply “only to 
psychopathic personality disorder”,2 follows precisely the wording recommended by the 
Scottish Law Commission (henceforth “SLC” or “Commission”) in its 2004 Report on Insanity 
and Diminished Responsibility (henceforth “Report”).3 The Commission also stated that this 
phrase meant “psychopathic personality disorder” or “psychopathy”.4 The Commission’s 
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1 s.51A(2). 
2 Explanatory notes, para 707. 
3 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (Scot Law Comm No.195, 
2004), p.78. 
4 Report (fn.3) para. 2.62. 
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exclusion of psychopathy was achieved via two main strategies: first, it provided its own 
definition of psychopathy, departing from and simplifying the features of a range of clinical 
psychiatric disorders; second, it attempted to justify the exclusion by reference to 
responsibility-related considerations alone.    
More will be said about the Commission’s perspective on psychopathy shortly. The second 
strategy, though, is hardly unusual, and is a standard approach in this territory. As Dixon J 
commented in the Australian High Court case of R v Porter, which the Commission refers to: 
 
it is perfectly useless for the law to attempt, by threatening punishment, to deter people from 
committing crimes if their mental condition is such that they cannot be in the least influenced 
by the possibility or probability of subsequent punishment; if they cannot understand what they 
are doing or cannot understand the ground upon which the law proceeds.5 
 
He then added that, due to this, the task of defining “classes of people who should not be 
punished”, despite the fact that they have acted in criminally proscribed ways, “is quite a 
different object to that which the medical profession has in view or other departments of the 
law have in view”.6 
But what if the class is extremely difficult to define? Some simplification, in such a case, 
is perhaps unavoidable, and may also be desirable given the legal as opposed to clinical 
concerns at hand; but there is inevitably a danger of oversimplification. Risk of 
oversimplification may also be heightened, in the case of “psychopathy”, by the emotionally-
charged nature of the subject matter. Persons with broadly-“antisocial” PDs commit a large 
number of criminal offences, including violent offences, and “psychopath” is of course a term 
of abuse. To quote Dixon J again, this class appears to exemplify the very “dangerous and 
vicious people” the criminal law attempts to protect society from.7 
In this paper I express some sympathy with the Commission’s portrayal of psychopathy, 
but argue that this is an oversimplification. I do this by providing a clinical overview of the 
main broadly-“antisocial” PDs in adults (Section B(2) below), and contrasting this with the 
Commission’s perspective on psychopathy (which, to avoid confusion, I call “SLC-
psychopathy”) (Section B(3)). I also examine studies in empirical moral psychology supportive 
of the possibility that some members of this diverse and problematic group lack capacity for 
criminal responsibility (Section C). This possibility is then supported by reference to one of 
the Commission’s own examples of a successful defence (Section D). 
This paper draws insights from non-legal disciplines and applies these to primarily legal 
issues. Because the result is a discourse that is somewhat “between” disciplines, it could 
perhaps be described as an “interdisciplinary” paper. The analysis, however, leads to 
conclusions with implications for law and policy. It may be appropriate, for example, to enable 
                                           
5 R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 186. 
6 R v Porter (fn.5) at 187. 
7 R v Porter (fn.5) at 186. 
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psychopaths to access the new defence where psychopathy is the only mental disorder in 
question; but many other, broader, issues are raised by this paper. A proper exploration of these 
various issues is beyond the scope of this paper; they are merely highlighted in Section D. 
Rather, the goal of this paper is to show, by means of a more detailed and rigorous analysis 
than that provided by the SLC, that these issues should be taken seriously. The terrain is more 
complex than supposed by the SLC, and the exclusion of psychopathy may be inappropriate.     
I begin in Section B(1) by outlining the new defence, and the mechanism of exclusion of 
psychopathy.        
 
B.  The mental disorder defence, and relationship with 
psychopathy 
 
(1)  Outline of the mental disorder defence, and the mechanism of exclusion of 
“psychopathy” 
 
As noted above, the reformed insanity defence is contained in s.51A of the CPSA. As regards 
the title of the defence, the SLC wished to depart from the term “insanity defence” due to the 
stigmatising associations of the term “insanity”;8 it did not, however, suggest a new title, an 
omission that was not remedied by the Scottish Parliament.9 Here I use the term “mental 
disorder defence” (and sometimes just “new defence”) as a shorthand.10 
Under the mental disorder defence, an accused is “not criminally responsible for conduct 
constituting an offence, and is to be acquitted of the offence, if the person was at the time of 
the conduct unable by reason of mental disorder to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of 
the conduct” (s.51A(1)). This retains the general form of the old insanity defence in Scots law: 
this required, first, that the accused experienced the effects of a disorder at the time of the 
alleged offence and that, second, this caused a “total alienation of reason” with respect to the 
act in question.11 The second part of the old defence, though, has now been substituted with an 
“appreciation” requirement.  
The meaning of “appreciation” in the new defence can be illuminated by contrast with the 
meaning of “knowledge” in the M’Naghten Rules. These Rules, which form the basis of the 
insanity defence in English law, hold that a defendant is presumed to have been sane unless a 
jury is satisfied that they did not (inter alia) “know the nature and quality of the act” or that it 
                                           
8 Report (fn.3) paras 2.19-2.24. 
9 See also G Maher, “The new mental disorder defences: Some comments” (2013) Scots Law Times 1, 1. 
10 The SLC also expressed concern about the use of the term ‘mental disorder defence’ as a shorthand: this, 
it was suggested, might misrepresent the nature of the defence, given that “mental disorder” only forms one 
component (i.e. the reason for a finding of non-responsibility), and cause confusion due to the use of “mental 
disorder” elsewhere in the CPSA (Report 2.21-22. See also Maher 2013 (fn.9) 1). Notwithstanding this, given 
the unwieldy official full title of the defence, “Criminal responsibility of persons with mental disorder”, I refer 
to it here as the “mental disorder defence”. 
11 Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38 at 43; see also MacKay v HM Advocate [2017] HCJAC 44; 2017 
G.W.D. 21-344, at [23]. 
 4 
was “wrong”.12 A common criticism of “knowledge” as a criterion here is that it is unfairly 
narrow: a defendant might possess this knowledge at the time of an alleged offence in a “thin” 
or “narrow” way, but fail to grasp its meaning in a broader sense that could, in the context, 
undermine their capacity for responsibility.13 Consequently, the SLC opted for the term 
“appreciate”, in line with other jurisdictions such as Canada, as this connoted “something wider 
than simple knowledge” and included “a level of (rational) understanding”.14  
The SLC provided two examples to illustrate this concern.15 In one, a schizophrenic mother 
smothers her children because she delusionally believes this is the only way to free them from 
demonic possession. In the M’Naghten sense, she “knows” the nature and quality of what she 
is physically doing and cannot therefore succeed with such a defence;16 in a broader sense, 
however, she fails to appreciate the true nature of her actions in that particular context (i.e. that 
the demonic possession is a delusion) and therefore, in the Commission’s view, should be 
entitled to a defence.  
In the second example, a severely clinically depressed mother kills her children because 
she delusionally believes this will protect them from her own terrible parenting. In this case, as 
per the M’Naghten Rules, she “knows” that her actions are both legally17 and morally “wrong”; 
again, though, she fails to appreciate the broader meaning and significance of this knowledge 
in a way that makes a defence appropriate. I shall say more about the SLC’s analysis of this 
example later, as this has implications for the access of psychopaths to the mental disorder 
defence.  
Notably, the SLC’s perspective on “appreciation” is consistent with how the term has been 
interpreted by Scottish courts. In the recent appeal case of MacKay v HM Advocate,18 it was 
accepted that the concept of “appreciation” was, as the SLC had argued, broader than mere 
“knowledge”.19 Moreover, the Commission’s approach to the assessment of “appreciation” was 
endorsed: Lord Carloway, delivering the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary, remarked that 
an inability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of conduct “can...cover an inability to 
conduct oneself in accordance with a rational and normal understanding”.20 This is discussed 
further in Section D below. 
The scope of mental disorders qualifying for the new defence includes PDs in general. This 
is due to the CPSA’s adoption of the broad definition of “mental disorder” in the Mental Health 
                                           
12 Daniel M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Finnelly 200 (HL), per Lord Tindal CJ at 210 (my 
emphasis). 
13 Report (fn.3) paras 2.42-2.51. 
14 Report (fn.3) paras 2.47. 
15 Report (fn.3) para. 2.45-46. 
16 See R v Codère (1917) 12 Cr App Rep 21 (CA) at 27, where it was held that “knowledge of nature and 
quality” meant knowledge of the physical aspects of one’s actions. This position was reiterated more recently in 
Sullivan, where it was held that lack of knowledge of the “nature and quality” of the act meant merely that the 
accused “did not know what he was doing” (R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156 (HL) per Lord Diplock at 173). 
17 See R v Windle [1952] 2 Q.B. 826 (CA), where it was held that “wrong” in the M’Naghten Rules meant 
legally wrong. This was reaffirmed, more recently, in R v Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978; [2008] Crim LR 
132. 
18 MacKay v HM Advocate [2017] HCJAC 44; 2017 G.W.D. 21-344. 
19 MacKay (fn.18) at [27]. 
20 MacKay (fn.18) at [30]. 
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(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003:21 s.328(1) of the 2003 Act defines “mental 
disorder” to include mental illnesses, learning disabilities and PDs “however caused or 
manifested”. The SLC, though, recommended excluding one class of PDs, namely those 
“characterised solely or principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible 
conduct” (s.51A(2)).22  
This phrase, the Commission clarified, was intended to refer to “psychopathy” or 
“psychopathic personality disorder” (terms the SLC used interchangeably).23 Its use was 
justified by reference to English24 and to an extent Scots law. As regards the latter, for example, 
in Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland Lord Lloyd of Berwick accepted that the appellant 
was “suffering from a ‘persistent and permanent mental disorder’ characterised by ‘abnormally 
aggressive and seriously irresponsible behaviour’”, before adding: “In other words he is a 
psychopath”.25 The Commission acknowledged that the expression “may be criticised from a 
psychiatric perspective as focusing on only some aspects of the disorder”, but defended its 
adoption on the grounds that it was “clearly understood to mean psychopathy”.26 This was later 
reiterated in the explanatory notes to the CPSA, which state that s.51A(2) “applies only to 
psychopathic personality disorder”.27  
It is important to recognise that “psychopathic personality disorder” was used by the SLC 
in a non-clinical way to refer to a range of clinical disorders. In the Discussion Paper preceding 
the Report, for example, the Commission used “psychopathy” and “anti-social personality 
disorder” interchangeably;28 in the Report, the SLC acknowledged its previous use of the term 
“anti-social personality disorder” but preferred the terms “psychopathic personality disorder” 
or “psychopathy”.29 Treating the various clinically recognised “antisocial personalities” as 
essentially the same, for the purposes of the mental disorder defence, is a key strategy adopted 
by the Commission. As I later critique this strategy, and argue that these disorders are not 
necessarily the same in this legal respect, it is helpful to initially provide a brief overview of 
this clinical terrain.    
 
  
                                           
21 s.307 CPSA. 
22 Note, though, that the Commission was prepared to accept that members of this class could be regarded 
as personality disorders (Report (fn.3) para. 2.61). The mechanism of exclusion, then, is in contrast to that 
adopted in the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code: in s.4.01(2) it is stated that “mental disease or 
defect” does not include “an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct”. 
Although the wording is slightly different to that employed by the SLC, the phrase is considered to exclude 
psychopathy (Report (fn.3) para. 2.59). 
23 Report (fn.3) paras 2.57–2.62. 
24 Prior to repeal by the Mental Health Act 2007, the Mental Health Act 1983 defined “psychopathic 
disorder” as a “persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including significant impairment of 
intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person 
concerned” (s.1(2)). 
25 [1999] 2 A.C. 512 at 515 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick. Referred to by SLC, Report (fn.3) para. 2.62. 
26 Report (fn.3) para. 2.62. 
27 Explanatory notes, para. 707. 
28 e.g. Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (Scot Law 
Com DP No 122, 2003) para. 2.52. 
29 Report (fn.3) para. 2.58. 
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(2) Clinical overview of the main “antisocial personalities” in adults 
 
A number of “antisocial personalities” are recognised as disorders, clinically, in adults.  The 
three main recognised conditions are: antisocial personality disorder (henceforth “ASPD”) in 
the DSM-IV and DSM-530 classification systems,31 dissocial personality disorder (henceforth 
“DPD”) in the ICD-10 classification system,32 and psychopathy as diagnosed by the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (henceforth “PCL-R psychopathy”).33 The PCL-R lacks the 
“official” status of the DSM and ICD classifications, but is nevertheless used widely.34    
The fact that these diagnoses have significantly overlapping symptoms can be confusing. 
Most people, for example, who score highly on the PCL-R also meet the criteria for ASPD; the 
converse, however, is not true – most people who meet the criteria for ASPD do not meet the 
criteria for PCL-R psychopathy. For practical purposes PCL-R psychopathy can be considered 
a more “extreme” or “severe” subset of ASPD, and researchers sometimes describe individuals 
meeting the criteria for ASPD “plus” or “minus” those for PCL-R psychopathy.35 It is 
important, therefore, to consider these PDs separately. 
PCL-R psychopathy is a reasonable place to start with this overview, if only because the 
criteria are more extensive and detailed than those of either ASPD or DPD. The PCL-R was 
developed by the psychologist Robert Hare in the late 20th century,36 and was significantly 
influenced by Hervey Cleckley’s theory of psychopathy.37 Cleckley, a U.S. Psychiatrist 
working around the mid-20th century, proposed that psychopathy was characterised, among 
other things, by a severe emotional (or affective) impairment, evident in traits such as emotional 
shallowness and insensitivity to the emotions of others due to lack of empathy. This affective 
impairment, he argued, was associated with behavioural features, such as antisocial or criminal 
behaviour, and a “mask of sanity” (or facade of normality).38 
Most of the affective, behavioural, and personality features suggested by Cleckley are 
present, subject to some refinements,39 in the PCL-R test (see Table 1). Most have been divided, 
                                           
30 The American Psychiatric Association is now utilising Arabic, rather than Roman, numerals to signify 
sequential revisions of its diagnostic and statistical manuals. 
31 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), 
4th edn (Washington: American Psychiatric Press, 2000); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 5th edn (Washington: American Psychiatric Press, 2013). 
32 World Health Organization, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical 
Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1992). 
33 R D Hare, The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 1991); R D Hare, The 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, 2nd edn (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 2003). 
34 For an overview, see A Forth, S Bo and M Kongerslev, “Assessment of psychopathy: The Hare 
Psychopathy Checklist measures” in K A Kiehl and W P Sinnott-Armstrong (eds), Handbook on psychopathy 
and law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 5. 
35 See, for example, S Gregory, R J Blair, D Ffytche et al, “Punishment and psychopathy: A case-control 
functional MRI investigation of reinforcement learning in violent antisocial personality disordered men” (2015) 
2 Lancet Psychiatry 153. 
36 e.g. R D Hare, “A research scale for the assessment of psychopathy in criminal populations” (1980) 1(2) 
Personality and Individual Differences 111. 
37 H Cleckley, The mask of sanity: An attempt to clarify some issues about the so-called psychopathic 
personality, 5th edn (St. Louis: Mosby, 1976). 
38 C J Patrick, “Antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy” in D W O’Donohue, K A Fowler and S O 
Lilienfeld (eds), Personality disorders: Toward the DSM-V, (Sage Publications, 2007), p.109, pp.112-115. 
39 For discussion of some of the changes made, see for example Hare (fn.36). 
 7 
by the statistical technique of factor analysis,40 into two main groupings: Factor 1, containing 
mostly personality- and affect-related items, and Factor 2, containing mostly items relating to 
antisocial and criminal behaviour; the two main Factors have also been divided via factor 
analysis into smaller “facets”, as shown in the Table.41 Each of the 20 items is scored by an 
interviewer, with the assistance of institutional and criminal records, on a 3-point scale ranging 
from “0” to “2”. For most items “0” means “not present”, “1” means “somewhat present”, and 
“2” means “definitely present”.42 Thus, the maximum possible score is 40.  
 
Factor 1: interpersonal/affective 
Facet 1: interpersonal Facet 2: affective 
 1. Glibness/superficial charm 6. Lack of remorse or guilt 
 2. Grandiose sense of self-worth 7. Shallow affect 
 4. Pathological lying 8. Callous/lack of empathy 
 5. Conning/manipulative 16. Failure to accept responsibility 
 
Factor 2: social deviance 
 Facet 3: lifestyle Facet 4: antisocial 
 3. Need for stimulation 10. Poor behavioural controls 
 9. Parasitic lifestyle 12. Early behaviour problems 
 13. Lack of realistic goals 18. Juvenile delinquency 
 14. Impulsivity 19. Revocation of conditional release 
 15. Irresponsibility 20. Criminal versatility 
 
No factor 
11. Promiscuous sexual behaviour 
17. Many short-term relationships 
Table 1: PCL-R factors, facets and items43 
 
Several items, particularly the “antisocial” items in Facet 4, refer to criminal behaviour, 
overtly within the item name (item 20) and/or in the associated clinical description. From a 
clinical perspective this is not necessarily problematic: as Skeem and Cooke argue, this 
behaviour can be viewed as a “downstream correlate” of features more central to 
                                           
40 Very roughly, factors represent a distillation of correlations between variables. In the case of 
psychological tests, variables are test items; scores on some items may covary, and factors are postulated to 
explain this covariance (see, for example, P Kline, An easy guide to factor analysis (London: Routledge 1994)). 
41 Both factors have subsequently been divided again by factor analysis, so the model is sometimes referred 
to as the “four factor model” (Forth et al. (fn.34) at 8). 
42 Forth et al. (fn.34) 6. 
43 Adapted, with permission, from R D Hare, “Psychopathy, the PCL-R, and criminal justice: Some new 
findings and current issues” (2016) 57(1) Canadian Psychology 21, 23 (Table 1 and Note). 
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psychopathy.44 In this regard, items in Factor 1, particularly the “affective” items in Facet 2, 
are sometimes considered the “core” features of psychopathy, even if in practice criminal 
behaviour may represent the main (if not the only) source of evidence used for the scoring of 
these items.45 From the perspective of the criminal justice system, however, this is 
(unsurprisingly) highly problematic, as the Court of Criminal Appeal pointed out in the English 
case of R v Dowds.46 For criminal courts, it is vital that evidence of criminal behaviour is more 
than merely evidence of this behaviour. It must point to something else, and in the context of 
an insanity plea shed light on the responsibility of the accused.47 This is the focus of Section C 
below (i.e. responsibility-relevant correlates of psychopathy).          
As regards the PCL-R scoring system, a score of 30 or more is recommended as a threshold 
or cut-score for a diagnosis of psychopathy, although it has been argued that 25 should be used 
in Europe, including Scotland, due to cultural differences.48 It is probably best, though, to view 
this “threshold” as a pragmatic, and somewhat arbitrary, way to designate certain individuals 
as “highly psychopathic”, rather than a means of identifying persons different in kind to those 
scoring less than the threshold. Evidence suggests that psychopathy is best thought of in 
dimensional, rather than categorical, terms.49 In other words, most people have at least some 
psychopathic traits whereas some, occupying the extreme end of a trait-spectrum, possess much 
more pronounced psychopathic traits; and while they may seem very different to those lower 
on the scale, they are merely different by degree.          
The criteria for ASPD, in contrast to PCL-R psychopathy, are predominantly behavioural. 
In both DSM-IV and 5 (where the criteria remain unchanged) 15 criteria are included. These 
mostly describe forms of adult antisocial behaviour, but also include a requirement for conduct 
disorder.50 Conduct disorder can be viewed as a possible childhood developmental precursor 
to ASPD; PCL-R psychopathy includes, somewhat similarly, the criterion of “juvenile 
delinquency”, although this is not a diagnostic requirement.51 
                                           
44 J L Skeem and D J Cooke, “Is criminal behavior a central component of psychopathy? Conceptual 
directions for resolving the debate” (2010) 22(2) Psychological Assessment 433; but see also R D Hare and C S 
Neumann, “The role of antisociality in the psychopathy construct: Comment on Skeem and Cooke (2010)” 
(2010) 22(2) Psychological Assessment 446. 
45 T A Widiger, “Psychopathy and DSM-IV psychopathology” in C J Patrick (ed), Handbook of 
psychopathy (Guilford Press 2006), p.156, pp.160-1. 
46 R v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 2576 at [31]. 
47 I set aside here the use of the PCL-R as a risk assessment tool (see e.g. A M Leistico, R T Salekin, J 
Decoster et al, “A large-scale meta-analysis relating the Hare measures of psychopathy to antisocial conduct” 
(2008) 32 Law and Human Behavior 28). 
48 D J Cooke and C Michie, “Psychopathy across cultures: North America and Scotland compared”, (1999) 
108(1) Journal of Abnormal Psychology 58; D J Cooke, C Michie, S D Hart et al., “Assessing psychopathy in 
the UK: Concerns about cross-cultural generalisability”, (2005) 186 British Journal of Psychiatry 335. Forth et 
al. comment that in Europe the “tradition among practitioners and researchers has been to use a lower cut-off 
score, often 25” (fn.34, 8). 
49 J F Edens, D K Marcus, S O Lilienfeld et al., “Psychopathic, not psychopath: Taxometric evidence for 
the dimensional structure of psychopathy” (2006) 115 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 131. 
50 Two additional criteria are a minimum age of 18, and a ‘comorbidity’ condition whereby the symptoms 
must not occur ‘exclusively during episodes of schizophrenia or mania’ (DSM-5 (fn.31) 659). 
51 For an in-depth recent review of theorised childhood precursors of both ASPD and PCL-R psychopathy, 
see P J Frick, J V Ray, L C Thornton et al., “Can callous-unemotional traits enhance the understanding, 
diagnosis, and treatment of serious conduct problems in children and adolescents? A comprehensive review” 
(2014) 140 Psychological Bulletin 1. 
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The reasons for the behavioural focus of the ASPD criteria are historical, dating back to the 
development of DSM-III in the 1970s. At that time there was significant concern about the 
reliability of DSM diagnoses, and more explicit behavioural criteria, with less scope for 
subjective clinical judgment, were seen as a way to address this issue.52 Later, prior to the 
introduction of DSM-IV, calls to make ASPD less behaviourally-focused again led to clinical 
field trials in which the DSM-III criteria were compared to an abbreviated version of the PCL-
R test;53 the trials, however, provided somewhat mixed evidence to support such a change, and 
the behavioural focus was retained.54 
One factor contributing to the field trial results was environmental. The DSM is designed 
for use, primarily, in normal clinical contexts, whereas the PCL-R (and, by extension, its 
abbreviated version) is designed for use in prison and forensic psychiatric settings.55 In normal 
clinical settings, the ASPD criteria appear reasonably capable of identifying persons with the 
personality and affective features of psychopathy;56 indeed, while these features are missing 
from the ASPD criteria, many are presented as “associated features” in DSM-IV and -5 
manuals. In prison and forensic psychiatric settings, though, where criminality is common, the 
ASPD is largely non-specific with respect to psychopathic traits. Roughly 50-80% of prison 
inmates meet the criteria for ASPD, while in contrast only 15% of inmates score highly on the 
PCL-R.57 This is why it is helpful, in this population, to know whether someone meeting the 
criteria for ASPD also scores highly on the PCL-R.    
The DPD criteria are something of a halfway-house between those for ASPD and PCL-R 
psychopathy. They include some of the affective and personality features seen in Factor 1 of 
the PCL-R, and some but not all of the antisocial/criminal behavioural criteria seen in ASPD 
and PCL-R Factor 2.58 The lengthy DPD criterion “gross and persistent attitude of 
irresponsibility and disregard for social norms, rules and obligations”, for example, is similar 
to ASPD criteria as well as some in PCL-R Factor 2; the DPD criterion “callous unconcern for 
the feelings of others”, however, is only present in the PCL-R (item 8, “callous/lacking 
empathy”) and is missing as an explicit ASPD criterion.59 Also, like the PCL-R but unlike the 
ASPD criteria, there is no requirement for a diagnosis of conduct disorder.60    
With this brief clinical overview in mind, I now examine the SLC’s approach to what it 
calls “psychopathy” more closely.           
 
                                           
52 Patrick (fn.38) 115-7. 
53 T A Widiger, R Cadoret, R Hare et al, “DSM-IV antisocial personality disorder field trial” (1996) 105 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 3. 
54 Widiger et al. (fn.53); see also C Crego and T A Widiger, “Psychopathy and the DSM” (2015) 83 Journal 
of Personality 665, 668-669. 
55 Crego and Widiger (fn.54) 668-9. 
56 Crego and Widiger (fn.54) 668. 
57 J.R. Ogloff, ‘Psychopathy/antisocial personality disorder conundrum’, (2006) 40(6-7) Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 519. These figures are mostly based on U.S. data. 
58 Ogloff (fn.57) 521. 
59 This symptom is mentioned, however, in the “associated features” section of both DSM-IV and DSM-5: 
“Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder frequently lack empathy and tend to be callous, cynical, and 
contemptuous of the feelings, rights, and sufferings of others” (DSM-IV (fn.31) 647; DSM-5 (fn.31) 660). 
60 ICD-10 (fn.32) 159. 
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(3) “Psychopathy” as understood by the Commission 
 
As noted at the end of Section B(1), the term “psychopathy” or “psychopathic personality 
disorder” was used by the SLC to refer to a range of clinical disorders. In the Discussion Paper, 
“anti-social personality disorder” (ASPD) was mentioned, and treated as interchangeable with 
“psychopathy”;61 in the Report the Commission added “dissocial personality disorder” (DPD) 
to the list.62 PCL-R psychopathy could also have been mentioned, but the Commission did not 
attempt an exhaustive list. These various disorders are then taken to refer, for the purposes of 
the SLC, to the same subject matter, which the SLC referred to in the Report as either 
“psychopathy” or “psychopathic personality disorder”.    
It is necessary to consider the SLC’s interpretation of psychopathy further because, as we 
have already seen, various terms for broadly “antisocial” personalities are in play and there is 
scope for confusion (e.g. do I mean clinical psychopathy or psychopathy as defined by the 
SLC?). I refer to the SLC’s take on psychopathy, therefore, as “SLC-psychopathy”. SLC-
psychopathy is not a clinical construct, but a representation of what the Commission thought 
were the responsibility-relevant features of the whole range of adult “antisocial” PDs. As the 
Commission put it, its concerns were “not…with the disposal of such persons within the 
criminal justice system”, or “with issues in the civil law” or “medical…treatment and care of 
psychopaths”, but with “the relationship between the defence based on an accused's mental 
disorder and psychopathy”.63     
Let us, then, examine SLC-psychopathy further. A few excerpts from the final Report, 
which may be regarded as more “definitive” of the SLC’s view, help to illuminate the main 
features: 
 
In most general terms the condition is associated with forms of anti-social (including criminal) 
behaviour by a person who cannot apply, or is indifferent about applying, normal moral 
standards and feelings to his actions.64 
 
Psychopathy does not have the effect that the person's reasons for acting as he did are in any 
way 'abnormal' or 'crazy' or 'disordered.' Rather, psychopathic personality disorder has the 
effect that because of the psychological make-up of the accused he has difficulties, not shared 
by the ordinary person, in complying with the requirements of the law.65 
 
He appreciates what he is doing. At most such a person has difficulties in controlling his 
conduct but it cannot be said that a psychopath is completely lacking in volitional capacity.66 
 
                                           
61 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (fn.28) para. 
2.52. 
62 Report (fn.3) para. 2.57. 
63 Report (fn.3) para. 2.58. 
64 Report (fn.3) para. 2.57. 
65 Report (fn.3) para. 2.60. 
66 Report (fn.3) para. 2.60. 
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…psychopathy does not have the effect that a person cannot control his conduct. Its effect is to 
make it more difficult, but not impossible, for the person concerned to behave in a way that he 
knows is correct.67 
 
These excerpts reveal a number of behaviours and capacities posited to typify SLC-
psychopathy. First, there is “antisocial (including criminal) behaviour”. This much is relatively 
uncontroversial, and is consistent with all three PDs outlined above. Second, there are 
assertions regarding (i) the reasons for action experienced by those falling into this class, (ii) 
the ability of these persons to control their actions, and (iii) their capacity to understand the 
wrongfulness of their actions. These claims are perhaps less obviously straightforward. 
Consider, first, reasons for action. If a person “cannot apply, or is indifferent about 
applying, normal moral standards or feelings to his actions” (first excerpt), does it necessarily 
follow that his reasons for action are normal (second excerpt)? Contrary to the second excerpt, 
his reasons for action could be regarded as abnormal by definition, relative to people in general, 
provided people ordinarily apply the moral standards or feelings in question; and whether this 
person’s thoughts are “crazy” or “disordered” seems to be an open question.     
Second, with respect to volitional capacity, the view that SLC-psychopaths have a reduced, 
but nonetheless residually present, capacity to comply with the law might seem to square neatly 
with clinical facets of all three disorders mentioned in the last Section. In particular, criteria 
relating to “impulsivity” suggest persons prone to acting without giving proper thought to the 
consequences of their actions, or despite recognising that they should not act in the way that 
they do.68 This potentially responsibility-relevant property of SLC-psychopaths, however, is 
something of a red herring because the proposed defence (now enacted) lacks a volitional 
component.69      
Third, and most importantly for the purposes of the reformed defence, SLC-psychopaths 
understand the wrongfulness of their actions. Such a person “appreciates what he is doing”, 
and is unable to act “in a way that he knows is correct”.70 The “normal moral standards or 
feelings” that this person “cannot apply, or is indifferent about applying” (mentioned in the 
first excerpt) are present in the background; they are a normal backdrop against which the 
aforementioned partial volitional impairments manifest. Thus, such a person could not hope to 
succeed with a mental disorder defence.  
This last issue is the focus of Section C, where I consider whether some persons within the 
spectrum of broadly “antisocial” PDs could lack an ability to “appreciate the nature or 
wrongfulness” of allegedly criminal conduct.               
 
                                           
67 Report (fn.3) para. 2.60. 
68 For example, in the DPD criteria, “very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of 
aggression…” (ICD-10 (fn.32) 159); in the ASPD criteria, “Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead” (DSM-5 
(fn.31) at 659); and in the PCL-R criteria, "impulsivity" (Forth et al. (fn.34) 7). 
69 Report (fn.3) para. 2.52-6. This is in contrast, for example, to the Model Penal Code: s.4.01(1) states that 
an insanity defence may be available where a person “lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” (emphasis 
added). 
70 Report (fn.3) para. 2.60 (emphasis added). 
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C.  Could some SLC-psychopaths be excluded inappropriately? 
 
Two main scientific hypotheses attempt to explain the inclination of persons with broadly 
“antisocial” PDs towards breaching moral norms: the moral judgment hypothesis, and the 
moral motivation hypothesis.71 According to the moral judgment hypothesis, these persons lack 
the capacity to make moral judgments. This could be for a range of reasons, including an 
inability to grasp moral reasons, and/or moral emotions, that ordinarily contribute to an ability 
to “appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of…conduct” (to use the terminology of the mental 
disorder defence).72 This hypothesis is therefore particularly relevant to Scots law. The moral 
motivation hypothesis posits that such persons are able to appreciate moral considerations and 
make moral judgments, but are indifferent to the outcomes of these judgments.                   
In this Section, the focus is on cognition rather than motivation, given the scientific focus 
on cognition in this area. I also focus mainly on studies concerning the capacity of psychopathic 
persons to make moral judgments.73 This discussion then provides empirical support for 
arguments, presented in Section D, that some psychopaths could potentially succeed with a 
mental disorder defence in Scots law (in the absence of the formal exclusion). The focus is also 
on PCL-R psychopathy (in all but the final study discussed), given the popularity of this test in 
cognitive neuroscientific research.74                   
A reasonable starting point is studies undertaken by Blair and colleagues in the mid-1990s 
concerning psychopathy and the “moral-conventional distinction”.75 Ordinarily, children learn 
to distinguish between moral and conventional norms and transgressions at around age three.76 
They recognise the normative difference, for example, between a harm-related (“moral”) rule 
like “don’t pull another child’s hair”, and an etiquette-related (“conventional”) rule like “don’t 
drink soup from a bowl”. In two studies by Blair and colleagues, PCL-R psychopaths failed to 
distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions along one of the axes typically 
tested for, “authority independence”. Both types of norm were rated as equally authority 
independent, in the sense that psychopathic participants reported that it would be “wrong” to 
breach these norms even if one were given permission to do so by an appropriate authority 
figure (the meaning of authority-independence in this experimental paradigm)77. Normally, 
                                           
71 J Schaich-Borg and W Sinnott-Armstrong, “Do psychopaths make moral judgments?” in K A Kiehl and 
W P Sinnott-Armstrong (eds), Handbook on psychopathy and law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
p.107. 
72 I remain neutral here (or at least attempt to) with respect to longstanding philosophical debates in 
metaethics concerning the importance of reasons and/or emotions to moral judgments. 
73 Readers are directed to the helpful review by Schaich-Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (fn.71) for more 
detailed discussion, covering all but the final two studies discussed here (by Young et al. and Baskin-Sommers 
et al.). 
74 N E Anderson and K A Kiehl, “The psychopath magnetized: Insights from brain imaging” (2012) 16(1) 
Trends in Cognitive Science 52, 53 (Box 1). 
75 R J R Blair, “A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the psychopath” (1995) 57 
Cognition 1; R J R Blair, L Jones, F Clark et al., “Is the psychopath `morally insane’?” (1995) 19(5) Personality 
and Individual Differences 741. 
76 D Kelly, S Stich, K J Haley et al., “Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction” (2007) 22(2) 
Mind & Language 117. 
77 The paradigm was originally developed by Turiel (E Turiel, The development of social knowledge: 
Morality and convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)). 
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only moral norms are considered to be authority-independent, so psychopathic participants 
appeared to be treating conventional norms as if they possessed the authority-independent force 
of moral norms (according to this paradigm, at least).       
These studies generated a fair amount of academic interest, given the implication that 
psychopaths might not understand the difference between moral and conventional norms.78 
One worry, though, was that the results could simply have been an artefact of “impression 
management”: psychopathic participants were all incarcerated, and treating conventional 
norms just as seriously as moral norms may have seemed prudent in that context (e.g. to 
increase the likelihood of an early release). In this regard, a more recent study by Aharoni et 
al., published in 2012, which used a larger sample size and a methodology modified to prevent 
impression-management, failed to reproduce these earlier findings.79 No significant differences 
were found between psychopathic and non-psychopathic subjects with respect to the moral-
conventional distinction, which was made successfully. While the methodology was not 
completely identical to that used in the initial studies, it was nevertheless broadly similar and 
it now seems unwise, pending further research at least, to place weight on the research by Blair 
et al.80         
This research is a useful starting point because it illustrates the need for caution in this area, 
and the dangers of leaping too quickly to conclusions regarding the moral competence of 
psychopaths. Once is it excluded from the picture, what we are left with is perhaps less 
obviously relevant to the criminal responsibility of psychopaths; I will argue, though, that there 
are some very promising research avenues at the moment which raise the possibility that some 
psychopaths have an impaired ability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of their actions.    
To set the scene for this discussion, it is helpful to first consider research involving “moral 
images” and “moral dilemmas”. In such studies, researchers typically wish to see whether 
abnormal answers are provided to questions, and in studies where neuroimaging is used 
whether answers are accompanied by abnormal brain activity. In one study by Harenski et al., 
for example, subjects were required to distinguish between images containing moral and 
nonmoral content, and rate the severity of depicted moral violations.81 No significant 
differences in responses were found between psychopathic and non-psychopathic subjects, 
either with respect to the distinction between moral and non-moral images, or severity ratings. 
Psychopathic participants, however, showed abnormal brain activity while distinguishing 
between moral and non-moral images, and also while rating the severity of moral violations.82        
                                           
78 e.g. N Levy, “The responsibility of the psychopath revisited” (2007) 14(2) Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
Psychology 129; C Fine and J Kennett, “Mental impairment, moral understanding and criminal responsibility: 
Psychopathy and the purposes of punishment” (2004) 27(5) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 425. 
79 E Aharoni, W Sinnott-Armstrong and K A Kiehl, “Can psychopathic offenders discern moral wrongs? A 
new look at the moral/conventional distinction” (2012) 121(2) Journal of Abnormal Psychology 484; for 
discussion, see J. Schaich-Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (fn.71) pp.115–7. 
80 For further discussion of these differences, and a note of caution regarding their applicability to the work 
by Blair and colleagues, see also N Levy, “Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content" (2014) 27(3) 
Philosophical Psychology 351, 355-358. 
81 C L Harenski, K A Harenski, M S Shane et al, “Aberrant neural processing of moral violations in 
criminal psychopaths" (2010) 119(4) Journal of Abnormal Psychology 863. 
82 In non-psychopathic participants, for example, the severity-ratings of depictions of moral violation 
correlated with amygdala activity; this correlation was lacking in psychopathic participants. In contrast to non-
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These findings largely parallel those from experiments in which subjects are presented with 
moral dilemmas. To appreciate this methodology, consider a so-called “trolley” moral dilemma 
(emblematic of this style of question): a runaway rail trolley is hurtling down a track towards 
a junction. Left alone, the trolley will kill five railway workers, but if you intervene and push 
a button, diverting the trolley onto another track, it will only cause the death of one worker. 
Should you press the button, thus actively causing someone’s death, or refrain from 
intervening?83 There is not necessarily a “right” or “wrong” answer, at least barring substantial 
moral philosophical debate (which these experiments are not designed to engage with).  
In the case of psychopathy, researchers have tested whether PCL-R psychopaths provide a 
specific pattern of (consequentialist) responses to moral dilemmas, including a subset of 
particularly controversial, so-called “high conflict”, moral dilemmas. The rationale is 
somewhat complex – the underlying hypothesis is prompted by patterns of decisions observed 
in patients with brain lesions in areas showing abnormally reduced activity in psychopathy.84 
In any event, findings in psychopathy have been mixed, and there is no strong support for this 
hypothesis.85 Again, though, as with the study by Harenski et al., several studies have revealed 
abnormal brain activity while PCL-R psychopaths make moral judgments.86    
The question, of course, is what this abnormal brain activity means. Glenn et al., who used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)87 to study brain activity in one “moral 
dilemma” study, argue that this is potentially consistent with the hypothesis that PCL-R 
psychopaths “make use of alternative cognitive strategies” to make moral judgments, 
particularly where judgments involve significant emotional processing (as is usually the case 
with “high conflict” dilemmas, where there is often significant interpersonal disagreement).88 
In these cases, so the hypothesis goes, psychopaths could be making moral judgments via 
“colder”, less emotion-related, cognitive mechanisms.89        
This “differential strategies” hypothesis has close ties to Cleckley’s theory of 
psychopathy.90 As noted earlier, Cleckley thought that a crucial component of psychopathy was 
a psychological “mask”, a facade created to paper-over emotional and psychological problems 
and enable highly psychopathic persons to function within society. Cleckley believed that many 
psychopaths occupied respected positions in society and that their “masks” could make an 
                                           
psychopathic participants, psychopathic participants also showed an increase in temporoparietal junction 
activity while making moral judgments. 
83 For a helpful discussion of these scenarios, see W Glannon, Brain, body, and mind: Neuroethics with a 
human face (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Ch.4. 
84 M Koenigs, M Kruepke, J Zeier et al, “Utilitarian moral judgment in psychopathy” (2012) 7 Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 708, 709. 
85 For helpful discussion, see Schaich-Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (fn.71), pp.117–20. 
86 Schaich-Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (fn.71) pp.123–4. 
87 fMRI measures brain activity indirectly, by measuring localised changes in magnetic fields which occur 
when oxygen is utilised within the brain. When blood flow increases to an active brain area, which normally 
occurs via an automatic reflex, deoxygenated haemoglobin is diluted by oxygenated haemoglobin; this alters the 
magnetic field in this area, which is then detected by the scanner (N K Logothetis, “The underpinnings of the 
BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging signal" (2003) 23(10) Journal of Neuroscience 3963). 
88 A L Glenn, A Raine, R A Schug et al, “Increased DLPFC activity during moral decision-making in 
psychopathy” (2009) 14(10) Molecular Psychiatry 909, 910. 
89 In this regard, see also Schaich-Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (fn.71) pp.123–4. 
90 Schaich-Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (fn.71) p.123. 
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“agreeable” or “positive” impression, even conveying “desirable and superior human 
qualities”.91 This idea is still very much alive in psychopathy research, and is the focus of 
research into so-called “successful” psychopathy.92 But Cleckley’s “mask” might also include 
a facade of moral competence, manifesting as an ability to “parrot” socially acceptable moral 
responses despite an inner lack of moral understanding.       
As is widely acknowledged, though, this hypothesis is highly speculative and much more 
research is required to support it. Furthermore, the finding that brain activity is “abnormal” 
does not tell us anything, in itself, about the quality of decisions made by psychopathic persons. 
The studies in question only examined the substantive moral conclusions reached by subjects, 
and not how they arrived at these conclusions. In other words, the studies examined 
“substantive” rather than “procedural” rationality.93 And as it is not possible to simply “read 
off” the content of a subject’s mind from an fMRI scan, future research would need to examine 
the reasons psychopaths had for their conclusions.94    
More promising lines of inquiry, at least at the moment, concern the sensitivity of 
psychopathic persons to morally-relevant information. In this regard, one recent study by 
Young et al. examined the extent to which PCL-R psychopaths were inclined to blame others 
for purely accidental harms.95 Normally, irrespective of any moral considerations we might 
have, people are inclined to blame others for entirely accidental harms.96 “Entirely” accidental, 
in this context, refers to harms that are neither intentional nor due to negligence on the part of 
the harm-causing agent; an example provided by Young et al. is accidental poisoning in 
circumstances where a host, making coffee for a guest, could not possibly know that a toxic 
substance had been substituted for sugar in a container labelled “sugar”.97 Participants in this 
study were presented with a range of hypothetical vignettes describing intentional, attempted, 
and entirely accidental harms, and asked to rate the “moral permissibility” of the described 
actions on a scale ranging from 0 (“morally forbidden”) to 7 (“morally acceptable”). Highly 
psychopathic subjects (PCL-R of 30 or more out of 40) were significantly more “forgiving” of 
entirely accidental harms than controls, or indeed subjects with intermediate levels of 
psychopathy (PCL-R score 21–29). Other scenarios were rated normally.                   
                                           
91 Cleckley (fn.37) pp.338–339. 
92 e.g. P Babiak and R D Hare, Snakes in suits: When psychopaths go to work (New York: Harper Collins, 
2007). 
93 For a helpful philosophically-minded discussion of issues in this area, including the distinction between 
substantive and procedural rationality, see see J Craigie and A Coram, “Irrationality, mental capacities and 
neuroscience" in N A Vincent (ed), Neuroscience and legal responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p.85. 
94 This effort might risk being frustrated by the very Clecklean mask it hopes to uncover: how, after all, can 
researchers be sure that the reasons proffered by psychopaths were the real reasons they had for their decisions? 
At the same time, though, “conversability” with a moral concept could indicate at least a minimal degree of 
competence with that concept (J Kennett, “Reasons, emotion, and moral judgement in the psychopath” in L 
Malatesti and J McMillan (eds), Responsibility and psychopathy: Interfacing law, psychiatry and philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) 243, 246-9). 
95 L Young, M Koenigs, M Kruepke et al., “Psychopathy increases perceived moral permissibility of 
accidents" (2012) 121(3) Journal of Abnormal Psychology 659. 
96 L Young, S Nichols and R Saxe, “Investigating the neural and cognitive basis of moral luck: It’s not what 
you do but what you know" (2010) 1(3) Review of Philosophy and Psychology 333. 
97 Supplementary materials, available online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0027489.supp> 4–5 (accessed 
24.10.17). 
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Care is required when interpreting this study. Unlike the aforementioned studies involving 
moral images and dilemmas, psychopathic participants gave abnormal answers; but, as Young 
et al. point out, these responses could be regarded as more morally appropriate or rational. Such 
a response might be given if someone took time to reflect on their intuitive inclination towards 
blame, and suppressed this by taking account of the non-culpable mental state of the harm-
causing agent. The authors argue that this apparently greater “forgiveness”, though, is probably 
due to a reduced emotional response to the harm caused, rather than greater reflection on the 
harm-causing agent’s mental state.98 The theory behind this argument is that the permissibility 
rating reflects the balance between two conflicting cognitive processes: one that evaluates an 
agent’s intentions, and another that evaluates the outcomes of an agent’s actions. Ordinarily, 
according to this theory, emotional processing “wins”, at least at least initially, leading to an 
intuitive judgment of blameworthiness (and therefore impermissibility); this part of the 
response, however, is significantly diminished in psychopaths, leading to a relatively 
unopposed evaluation of intention.99       
This explanation is plausible, at least insofar as it is in keeping with more established facts 
about psychopathy. Earlier studies, for example, have demonstrated that highly psychopathic 
persons are less sensitive than non-psychopaths to sad and fearful faces, as well as to sad and 
fearful tones of voice.100 There is also a reduced galvanic skin response (reduced electrical 
conductivity, due to reduced sweating) in response to observed fear, pain and sadness, 
consistent with a reduced empathic emotional response.101 Furthermore, substantial fMRI and 
sMRI (structural magnetic resonance imaging) data supports the existence of emotional 
processing-related problems in psychopathy.102                   
One might perhaps question the relevance of this study to criminal law, given the 
importance of intentional and attempted harms in this context (which psychopaths were 
seemingly able to evaluate normally.103 The study does, however, highlight the importance of 
emotional processing for decision-making. Moreover, it is in line with other recent research 
suggesting that psychopaths have difficulty incorporating the emotion of regret into 
decisions.104 This research, which I now consider, is more obviously relevant to the 
responsibility of psychopaths. 
                                           
98 Young et al. (fn.95) 664. 
99 Young et al. (fn.95) 660). See also F Cushman, “Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of 
causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment” (2008) 108(2) Cognition 353. 
100 A A Marsh and R J R Blair, “Deficits in facial affect recognition among antisocial populations: A meta-
analysis" (2008) 32 Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 454; A Dawel, R O’Kearney, E McKone et al, “Not 
just fear and sadness: Meta-analytic evidence of pervasive emotion recognition deficits for facial and vocal 
expressions in psychopathy” (2012) 36 Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 2288. 
101 Dawel et al. (fn.100). 
102 For a relatively recent review of work in this area, together with wider findings, see Anderson and Kiehl 
(fn.74). 
103 It has been argued that harm-related emotional responses may be important for moral development (e.g. 
R J R Blair, “The amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in morality and psychopathy" (2007) 11(9) 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 387). Whether a failure of this mechanism could prevent the acquisition of moral 
competence, though, is highly questionable, as there may be other routes to the development of this competence 
(H L Maibom, “The mad, the bad, and the psychopath” (2008) 1 Neuroethics 167). 
104 A Baskin-Sommers, A M Stuppy-Sullivan and J W Buckholtz, “Psychopathic Individuals exhibit but do 
not avoid regret during counterfactual decision making” (2016) 113 Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 14438, 14439. 
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Normally, when making decisions (moral or otherwise), we take into account the potential 
of a contemplated course of action to engender regret. In this regard, regret is more than simply 
an unpleasant feeling we experience when we realise that, had we made a different choice, 
there would have been a better outcome; rather, the envisaged potential for regret helps us to 
select one option from a range of possibilities (i.e. assists with counterfactual decision-
making).105 In a study involving economic decision-making, Baskin-Sommers et al. found that 
despite apparently experiencing regret normally, with respect to poor decisions, psychopaths 
were considerably less likely to take potential for regret into account when making decision: 
in contrast to control participants, psychopaths predominantly relied on anticipated economic 
value when making decision.106 And while this action-guiding (or “behavioural”) regret-
insensitivity did not appear to impair economic decision-making, the obvious topic of the study, 
a significant correlation was found between this regret-insensitivity in psychopathic 
participants and number of previous criminal incarcerations.107          
This research further highlights the importance of emotional processing for rational 
decision-making in psychopathy. And in contrast to the study by Young et al., where one might 
question the relevance of the findings to the criminal law, emotion appears in this case to have 
a more critical role. These are relatively new findings and would benefit from replication 
(especially with the PCL-R, as a related self-report test was used108). Nevertheless, this study 
is potentially significant and, given the apparently normal emotional experience of regret (or 
“affective” regret) by psychopathic participants, also highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between the experience of emotions and their actual use in decision-making in 
psychopathy.     
Finally, this study raises fascinating questions about sensitivity to remorse in psychopathy. 
From the behavioural economics-related perspective of Baskin-Sommers et al.’s study, regret 
can be characterised as a negative feeling arising from knowledge that a different choice would 
have caused a better result for oneself; remorse, in contrast, can be viewed as a negative feeling 
arising from knowledge that a different choice would have caused a better result for others.109 
If the results of this study also hold for remorse, a question which requires further research,110 
this could help to explain why psychopaths make such terrible decisions with respect to others 
as well as themselves. Research in this area, therefore, has implications extending well beyond 
economic decision-making.      
                                           
105 e.g. G Coricelli and A Rustichini, “Counterfactual thinking and emotions: Regret and envy learning” 
(2010) 365 Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 241; N Camille, V A Pironti, C M Dodds et al., “Striatal 
sensitivity to personal responsibility in a regret-based decision-making task” (2010) 10 Cogn Affect Behav 
Neurosci 460. 
106 Baskin-Sommers et al. (fn.104) 14440-14441. 
107 Baskin-Sommers et al. (fn.104) 14441. 
108 The full version of the Self-Report Psychopathy-III (SRP-III) was used. Baskin-Sommers et al. discuss 
this test in supporting information for their paper, available here 
<www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1609985113/-/DCSupplemental> (accessed 24.10.17). See also, 
for example, S. Gordts, K. Uzieblo, C. Neumann et al., “Validity of the Self-Report Psychopathy scales (SRP-III 
full and short versions) in a community sample” (2017) 24 Assessment 308. 
109 Baskin-Sommers et al. (fn.104) 14443. 
110 Baskin-Sommers et al (fn.104) 14443. 
 18 
With this scientific perspective in mind, I now return to the relationship between 
psychopathy and the “mental disorder” defence in Scots law.          
 
D. Re-evaluating the exclusion 
 
As mentioned earlier, the reason for presenting an overview of clinical perspectives of PDs, 
and discussing empirical moral psychology, was to assist with a critique of the Commission’s 
strategy with respect to this problematic group. This strategy, as noted, is to treat the group as 
essentially identical, for the purposes of the mental disorder defence. Section B(3) outlined the 
main features of what was termed SLC-psychopathy (“psychopathic personality disorder” as 
defined by the SLC), and Section C examined research suggesting that a subgroup of SLC-
psychopaths may have responsibility-relevant impairments.  
To recap, in Section C it was seen that psychopaths have difficulty incorporating emotional 
information into morally-relevant decisions, and that emotion-sensitivity issues include the use 
of regret in counterfactual decision-making. This research, it was argued, supports the claim 
that some SLC-psychopaths may have responsibility-relevant impairments. Furthermore, given 
that psychopathy may be dimensional in nature, it is possible that at least some SLC-
psychopaths may have severe impairments in this regard.    
This research, therefore, threatens to undermine the SLC’s lumping strategy with respect 
to “antisocial” PDs. Should the concept of SLC-psychopathy, then, be abandoned? Is it time to 
consider reforming the mental disorder defence, perhaps to permit at least some psychopathic 
persons to raise the defence?                 
A conservative response to this question might be to argue that while the abnormalities 
identified could be responsibility-“relevant”, they cannot be sufficient to render psychopathic 
persons incapable of appreciating the nature or quality of allegedly criminal conduct. The 
research by Baskin-Sommers et al., it might be argued, at best only helps to explain why some 
psychopaths make bad decisions, and an accused is not entitled to a defence merely because he 
or she made a bad decision. Indeed, it might be added, this research only sheds light on why an 
SLC-psychopath might find it “more difficult, but not impossible,…to behave in a way that he 
knows is correct” (to quote the words of the SLC, discussed in Section B(3)). A sceptic might 
also cite the aforementioned research by Young et al., showing apparently normal 
understanding of the moral permissibility of intentional harms, and point to the obvious 
importance of “wrongful intentions” to the criminal law. 
While one can be sympathetic towards this SLC-orientated perspective, it misses a deeper 
issue. As noted earlier, an important facet of the research by Baskin-Sommers et al. is the 
distinction between “affective” and “behavioural” aspects of emotional processing. Highly 
psychopathic participants were apparently able to experience regret normally, when it became 
clear that a different choice would have resulted in a better outcome for themselves; they had 
difficulties, however, incorporating the potential for regret into decisions. This distinction has 
not typically been recognised in the literature on psychopathy (both scientific and non-
scientific), where the condition has traditionally been presented as one in which individuals 
have a “lack of” emotions like regret or remorse. But psychopaths may be able to experience 
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these emotions normally with regard to the outcomes of past decisions, yet unable to 
incorporate them into current decisions; and, moreover, this planning-related issue may 
correlate with real-world antisocial behaviour (as found, in this study, with number of criminal 
incarcerations). This, though, is also a distinction that could be made with respect to the mental 
disorder defence in Scots law: psychopaths may be able to “appreciate” aspects of their 
emotional experience, but unable to “appreciate” the weight of these emotional factors in the 
context of real-time decision-making.     
This places us squarely within the territory of the examples provided by the SLC, 
mentioned in Section B(1) above. Consider, in particular, the second example, concerning a 
mother with severe depression who kills her children to protect them from future suffering due 
to her own terrible parenting. As the Commission stated, she “knows that what she is doing is 
at one level morally (and legally) wrong”, and also “may feel considerable regret about carrying 
out her actions”; however, she nevertheless “considers that she has an overriding reason for 
doing what is otherwise wrong”.111 In terms of legal analysis, the Commission suggested that 
this could be viewed as a case where “mental disorder (depression) distorts her reasoning about 
what is right (and wrong) for her to do”. It then cited, to clarify this, the aforementioned 
Australian case of R v Porter, where Dixon J remarked that the critical issue with respect to 
“appreciation” was whether the accused… 
 
…was able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time. 
Could this man be said to know in this sense whether his act was wrong if through a disease or 
defect or disorder of the mind he could not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary 
people make that act right or wrong? If through the disordered condition of the mind he could 
not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that 
he could not know that what he was doing was wrong.112 
 
This analysis could apply to a person who was unable, due to psychopathy, to incorporate 
the potential for regret into a decision. It could be argued, that is, that this inability meant the 
accused was unable to bring a “moderate degree of sense” to bear on the decision, and that this 
irrationality, relative to the rationality of “ordinary people”, led to the allegedly criminal 
conduct. In this way, arguably, psychopathy could form the sole basis of a mental disorder 
defence in Scots law. As noted earlier, this analysis is also consistent with the defence as it has 
been interpreted by Scottish courts, with the High Court of Justiciary holding in MacKay that 
“appreciation” can “cover an inability to conduct oneself in accordance with a rational and 
normal understanding”.113 
The findings of Baskin-Sommers et al. are of course new, and would benefit from further 
study and replication; indeed, the authors describe their perspective as an “alternative 
viewpoint” which currently “merits consideration”.114 Their research, however, exposes a 
problem with the SLC’s strategy: SLC-psychopathy represents a fixed and conceptually-closed 
                                           
111 Report (fn.3) para. 2.46. 
112 R v Porter (fn.5) at 189–90. 
113 MacKay (fn.18) at [30]. 
114 Baskin-Sommers (fn.104) 14441. 
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simplification of clinical perspectives of psychopathy, and is inevitably hostage to scientific 
developments that fail to fit. And because this simplification has formed the basis of the 
exclusion in s.51A(2) of the CPSA, the statutory defence is also at odds (actually or potentially) 
with these developments.    
One solution to this problem might be for a creative re-interpretation, by the criminal 
courts, of the phrase “characterised solely or principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct”. It could be argued, for example, that emerging evidence concerning 
“regret” shows that in at least some cases psychopathy is characterised neither “solely” nor 
“principally” by “abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”, and that some 
psychopaths should be permitted to raise the defence on this basis. The phrase, however, is 
stated to refer to “psychopathy” as a category in both the explanatory notes to the Act and by 
the SLC; there is also the policy-related issue that the SLC has provided a restrictive 
interpretation of the responsibility-relevant features of this group.        
 The problems with the SLC’s strategy may indeed be twofold. On the one hand, some 
degree of simplification and generalisation is required to facilitate legal and policy-based 
analysis of a subject matter as heterogeneous as the “antisocial” PDs. As the Commission 
correctly states, the topic of “psychopathy” is controversial across various disciplines, and there 
is no established terminology (as seen, in Section B(2) above, with respect to ASPD, DPD and 
PCL-R psychopathy).115 But this raises the question of how much simplification is appropriate, 
given that oversimplification may misrepresent the subject matter (which, I have argued by 
reference to research in empirical moral psychology, may be the case). On the other, the 
Commission committed itself to determining the right of access of this complex class of 
persons to the mental disorder defence by reference to responsibility-based considerations 
alone (as noted in Section B(3) above). And as we have seen, when one considers the emerging 
science in this area, it may be difficult to distinguish between the responsibility-relevant 
features of at least some psychopaths and those relevant in one of the Commission’s own 
examples of a successful mental disorder defence. 
 It may, of course, be possible to find ways to distinguish between these cases without 
leaving the domain of responsibility theory. This, though, would entail a much more thorough 
analysis than presented in the Report or the preceding Discussion Paper. This analysis would 
also risk generating more heat than light, as this is an ongoing and rather fraught area of 
philosophical debate.116 In the end, the Commission may have erred on the side of 
oversimplification, given that this is capable of providing a reasonably clear, and pragmatically 
workable, policy.    
                                           
115 Report (fn.3) para. 2.57. 
116 e.g. S J Morse, “Psychopathy and criminal responsibility” (2008) 1(3) Neuroethics 205; A Duff, 
“Psychopathy and answerability” in L Malatesti and J McMillan (eds), Responsibility and psychopathy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) p.199; K Levy, “Dangerous psychopaths: Criminally responsible but not 
morally responsible, subject to criminal punishment and to preventive detention” (2011) 48 San Diego Law 
Review 1299; P Litton, “Criminal responsibility and psychopathy: Do psychopaths have a right to excuse?" in K 
A Kiehl and W P Sinnott-Armstrong (eds), Handbook on psychopathy and law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013) p.275. 
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What, then, can be taken from this discussion? I would suggest the following general points, 
with the goal of improving future legal and policy debate in this area. First, it should be 
recognised that what the Commission called “psychopathy” is an evolving topic that is 
considerably more complex than represented in the Report, and that there is a risk of 
oversimplification in this area.  
Second, a more scientifically-informed take on “psychopathy” raises significant 
responsibility-related questions that can be obscured by an oversimplified, overgeneralised, 
approach to the topic. I have only raised this issue here briefly, with respect to the mental 
disorder defence, by suggesting that the Commission’s own analysis may apply to a subset of 
psychopathic persons. This possibility invites closer examination from a responsibility theory 
perspective.          
Other responsibility-related questions are also raised, however, extending beyond the 
mental disorder defence. One concerns whether the mental disorder defence is the appropriate 
focus for this enquiry. If a subset of psychopaths could succeed with this defence on capacity-
based grounds, an issue is that the incapacity in question is a “normal” state of affairs for these 
persons as it is a persisting feature of a personality disorder; it is not a transient deviation from 
the norm, such as a manic episode in bipolar disorder, that might temporarily vitiate 
responsibility. Given this issue, perhaps fitness to plead is a more apt focus than the mental 
disorder defence: rather than stand trial, perhaps the relevant subset of psychopaths should be 
diverted, pre-trial, towards hospital-based treatment.117 
Further responsibility-related questions raised concern the management of psychopaths 
falling short of “insanity” but with significantly impaired capacity. If psychopathy is 
dimensional in nature, this could be a much larger group than the extreme subset considered 
above. In this case “defences” might be an appropriate focus, but an issue is that there is no 
general defence of diminished responsibility or capacity in Scots law. As with England and 
Wales, diminished responsibility is only available as a defence to a murder charge. Currently, 
impaired capacity can be a mitigating factor at a sentencing stage; the possible existence of a 
large group of offenders with diminished capacity, however, raises questions about the 
appropriateness of this approach. This issue has been explored with respect to mental disorders 
more generally,118 but perhaps should be examined further from the specific perspective of 
psychopathy. 
Finally, the possibility that responsibility theory-related arguments could justify success 
with a mental disorder defence for some psychopaths should encourage greater discussion of 
relevant non-responsibility related concerns. Perhaps there are good reasons for a blanket 
exclusion even if responsibility-based arguments suggest that a subgroup should be granted 
access to a defence. Public confidence, for example, might be lost in the criminal justice system 
if such “obviously bad” persons were to succeed with pleas, or there is a realistic concern that 
psychopaths could use their manipulative talents to secure early release from hospital if 
                                           
117 Under s.57 of the CPSA. 
118 e.g. J Horder, “Pleading involuntary lack of capacity” (1993) 52 Cambridge Law Journal 298. 
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detained there following a successful plea.119 If these concerns are not discussed openly, they 
may influence policy covertly (e.g. by helping to motivate an oversimplified analysis of 
psychopathy).           
                                           
119 Under s.57 of the CPSA. For discussion of these and other “consequentialist” concerns, in a U.S. 
context, see Litton (fn.116). 
